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The Court of Justice of the European
Communities: The Scope of its
Jurisdiction and the Evolution of its
Case Law under the EEC Treaty
Honorable Lord Alexander
John Mackenzie Stuart*

The European Court of Justice, as the sole judicialinstitution of the
European Communities, has evolved into a vigorous body assertinga strong
cohesive influence upon the Member States through applicationof theprincipies assertedin the Communities' Treaties. In this article,LordMackenzie
Stuart examines thejurisdiction of the Court in light of recent case law. In
particular, Judge MacKenzie Stuart discusses doctrines of urisdiction
adopted by the Court andthe applicationof these doctrines to recent developments involvingfree movement of goods and ofpersons within the Communities andother Treatyprincilessuch as equalpayformen and women.
I.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT UNDER THE

EEC TREATY

The Court of Justice first came into being in 1953 as the Court of
Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community. The Court was at
the time composed of six judges and two advocates general. In 1958,
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands established both the European Economic
and the Atomic Energy Communities through the signing of the EEC
and "Euratom" treaties, respectively. Those treaties expanded the
Court's jurisdiction to encompass all three Communities. In 1973,
Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland became Community members and were
* Judge on the European Court of Justice. The author would like to thank his Legal Secre-

tary, Mr. Angus Mackay, for his kind assistance in the preparation of this article.
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followed by Greece, who on January 1, 1981 became the tenth Member
State of the European Economic Community.
At the present time, the Court consists of eleven judges, one from
each Member State and an additional French judge, and is assisted by
five Advocates General, one each from France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Article 164 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (the EEC Treaty) provides
that "[t]he Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and
application of this Treaty the law is observed."' The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC Treaty)2 and
the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (the
Euratom Treaty)3 contain similar provisions. However, this article is
confined to the EEC Treaty, since it is from this Treaty and from the
regulations, decisions and directives issued pursuant to it, that the
Court derives by far the greater part of its activities.
The scope of jurisdiction of the Court under the EEC Treaty is
considerable. For example, apart from "actions" brought before it directly, and from references by national courts or tribunals for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of a provision of Community law or
on the validity of an act of a Community institution, the Court has
jurisdiction under the Article 228 of the Treaty to give an opinion, at
the request of the Council or minister of the European Commission or
a Member State, as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible
with the provisions of the Treaty.4 A recent instance of the exercise of
this jurisdiction was an Opinion delivered, following a request from the
Commission, as to whether the draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber which was the subject of negotiations in the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was compatible
with the Treaty, and more particularly, whether the Community was
competent to conclude that agreement. 5 This function of giving advice
to international institutions is, of course, a familiar one in classic international law.
I Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(enteredin force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
2 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S.
140 (enteredinforce July 23, 1952) [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty].
3 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
169 enteredin force Jan. 1, 1958 [hereinafter cited as Euratom Treaty].
4 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 228. An agreement found to be incompatible with the
provisions of the EEC Treaty may enter into force only under the conditions laid down in Article
236 of the EEC Treaty. Id.
5 Re The Draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber (opinion 1/78), 22 O.J. Eun.
COMM. (No. C 279) 3 (1979), [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2871, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 639.
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Proceedings before the Court are for ease of reference, usually divided into "direct" actions, on the one hand and references for a preliminary ruling made by national courts and tribunals, on the other.
However, within these areas, the nature and extent of the Court's jurisdiction varies in many ways.
There are several Treaty provisions which confer jurisdiction upon
the Court in many types of "direct" actions. Thus, in the event of disputes between Member States or Community institutions, the Court
acts as a kind of international arbitration body although the law which
is applied is by its nature common to the systems of the parties rather
than wholly designed to regulate their relations inter se. For example,
under Article 170, a Member State which considers that another Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty may bring
the matter before the Court.6 Such cases are very rare, but a recent
one, which did result in a decision of the Court, was an action brought
by the French Republic against the United Kingdom for a declaration
that by bringing into force an Order prohibiting the use of certain
small-mesh fishing nets within British fishing limits, the United Kingdom had failed to fulfill its obligations under the EEC Treaty.7 After
hearing the case, the Court made a declaration in the terms sought by
the French Government.'
More frequently, in direct actions, the Court hears cases brought
by Member States, the Council or Commission under Article 173,1 contesting the legality of regulations, decisions or directives of the Council
or the Commission.
Article 173, in its second paragraph, states that any natural or legal
persons may institute proceedings against a decision addressed to them
"or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a
decision addressed to another person, is of direct and specific concern"
to them." Thus, the right of action for private persons to contest a
Community act is defined very narrowly. Such persons, other than
those to whom a decision of a Community institution is specifically
6 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 170. A Member State, however, must refer the matter to
the Commission prior to instituting a proceeding against another Member State relating to an
alleged infringement of the Treaty's obligations. Id.
7 French Republic v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, [1979] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2923, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 6.
8 The Court in French Republic v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
declared that, by bringing into force the fishing nets order of 1977, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland had failed to fulfil its obligations under the EEC Treaty. Id. at
2943, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 24.
9 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 173.
10 Id.
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addressed, find this requirement to be a formidable obstacle if they
wish the Court to adjudicate the substance of an action for the annulment of a Community act. In order to comply with Article 173, a person must first persuade the Court that the act in question is a decision
which, although taking the form of a regulation or a decision addressed
to another person, is of direct and individual concern to them. Without
citing from the copious case law on this point, suffice it to say that only
in comparatively few cases have private persons overcome this initial
hurdle regarding the "admissibility" of their action.
Article 173 is complemented by Article 17511 which provides for
actions, not against acts of the institutions, but rather against the institutions for failing to take action. The Article is in fact little used by the
Council, Commission or the Member States. Private persons rarely attempt to bring an action against the Council or Commission for failing
to address to them individually an act "other than a recommendation
or opinion" because of the narrow wording of its third paragraph.' 2
Article 17211 makes provision for appeals against penalties which
are laid down by Community Regulations. For example, under Regulation 17/62 of the Council' 4 which implements the antitrust legislation
in the Common Market, the Commission may, among other things, impose fines and issue orders against undertakings which restrict competition in breach of the prohibitions delineated in Articles 85 and 86.15
Against such penalties Article 172 provides an appeal of which the
Court has unlimited jurisdiction, which means that the Court cannot
6
only annul but can also alter the penalty imposed.'
The Court also has jurisdiction in actions for damages regarding
the Community's contractual and non-contractual liability pursuant to
Article 21517 in conjunction with Article 178.18 Contractual liability is
I IId. at art.

175.
12 The third paragraph of Article 175 provides that "[a]ny natural or legal person may submit
to the Court of Justice. . . a complaint to the effect that one of the institutions of the Community
has failed to address to him an act other than a recommendation or an opinion." Id.
13 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 172.
14 Regulation 17/62, J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962), O.J. EUR. COMM. 87 (Spec. Ed. 1959-62).
15 Article 85, for example, prohibits agreements "likely to affect trade between the Members
States and which have as their object of result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market ..
" EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 85. Article 86, on the
other hand, prohibits "action by one or more enterprises to take advantage of a dominant position
within the Common Market" to the extent to which trade between Member States will be affected.
Id. at art. 86.
16 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 172.
17 Id. at art. 215.
18 Article 178 provides that "[t]he Court of Justice shall be competent to hear cases relating to
compensation for damages as provided for in Article 215, second paragraph." Id. at art. 178.

The Court of Justice
3:415(1981)
governed by the law applicable to the contract in question19 and, there-

fore, disputes relating to that liability fall within the jurisdiction of the
national courts. Thus, unless the Court is designated as the competent
body by an arbitration clause in the contract, the Court of Justice will
not consider such cases.
The non-contractual liability of the Community poses more difficult problems. The second paragraph of Article 215 provides that the
Community shall "in accordance with the general principles common
to the laws of Member States make reparation for any damage caused
by its institutions or by its employees in the performance of their
duties."2
In this connection, it is of particular interest that the Court determined that Community liability may be established by acts of a normative character, i.e. by a regulation. If a regulation constitutes a grave
violation of a superior rule of Community law (for example, the principle of non-discrimination between producers of like products) which is
designed to protect interests affected by that regulation, then compensation may be provided for any damage which results from the application of invalid legislation. Such actions, however, have rarely met with
success. 21 In practice, however, this ostensibly liberal view has given
little satisfaction to private litigants seeking damages on grounds of the
non-contractual liability of a Community institution. The Court has
often been at pains to point out that a finding that a legislative measure, such as a regulation, is null and void is insufficient by itself to
create non-contractual liability for damage caused to individuals. According to the Court, the Community should not be held liable for legislative measures which involve choices of economic policy unless there
has been sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of law. The
Court has taken into consideration the principles of the legal systems of
the Member States governing the liability of public authorities for
damages caused to individuals by legislative measures and concluded
19 Id. at art. 215, first para.

20 Id., second para.
21 In Compagnie Continentalev. Council, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 117, [1975] 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 578, for example, an exporter of French cereals sought compensation from the Council
of the European Communities. The exporter's claim was based upon the fact that the Council, by
regulation, had changed the value of the compensatory amounts payable in trade without safeguarding the position of traders who had relied on the Councils earlier stated values. The Court
found the applicant to be a prudent exporter fully informed of the conditions of the market. As a
result, the Court held that "the damage alleged (had) not been cansed by the conduct of the
Council." Id. at 136, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 606. See also Comptoir National Technique
Agricole (CNTA) v. Commission, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 533, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
171.
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that only under exceptional circumstances will public authorities incur
liability for legislative measures involving economic policy. This restrictive view is supported by policy considerations because legislative
authorities, even when the validity of its measures is subject to judicial
review, should not be hindered in making economic decisions by the
prospect of applications for damages whenever it adopts legislative
measures for the public which may adversely affect an individual's
interest.
In the leading case of Bayerische HNL Vermerhrungsbetriebe
GmbH & Co. KG and Others v. Council and Commission,2 2 the Court
concluded that individuals may be required, in sectors coming within
the Community's economic policy, to accept within reasonable limits
certain harmful effects on their economic interests resulting from legislative measure without being able to obtain compensation from public
funds even if the measure has been declared null and void.2 3 The
Court went on to hold in the HNL case that in the legislative field the
Community does not incur liability unless the institution manifestly
and gravely disregarded limits on the exercise of its power.2 4
Thus, the application of such a rigorous precondition to the establishment of non-contractual liability in cases of invalid legislative
measures involving economic policy in effect means that the economic
operators of the Community will rarely succeed in recovering damages
for a "legislative wrong" under the second paragraph of Article 215 of
the Treaty.
Article 17926 of the Treaty also gives the Court what is in effect an
administrative jurisdiction in disputes between Community institutions
and their servants. These disputes are numerous and occupy an undue
proportion of the Court's time, even though they are always heard by a
Chamber (consisting of three judges) of the Court. However, it is conceivable that in the future an administrative tribunal of first instance
will hear these cases and the Court of Justice will hear only an appeal
on a point of law.
Under Article 169 the Commission may bring an action against a
22 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1209, [19781 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 566.
23 Id. at 1224, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 592.
24 Id. In the HNL case, one of the chief features of the institution was the need for a great
deal of discretion in order to implement a Common Agricultural Policy. Thus, the Court's holding allows the institutions to implement this policy free from liability within reasonable bounds.
25 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 215.
26 Id. at art. 179. Article 179 provides that "[t]he Court of Justice shall be competent to decide
in any case between the Community and its employees, within the limits and under the conditions
laid down by the relevant statute of service of conditions of employment." Id.
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Member State if it "considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill
an obligation under this Treaty."27 The Commission must first deliver
a reasoned opinion regarding the Member State concerned to fulfill its
obligation within a certain period. If the State concerned does not
comply with the Commission's opinion within the specified period,
then the Commission may bring the matter before the Court. If the
Court finds that the Member State has failed to fulfill a Treaty obligation then, according to Article 171, "such State shall take the measures
required for the implementation of the judgment of the Court."2
In only one case, Commission v. French Republic, has there been
what appeared to be a refusal by a Member State to comply with the
Court's judgment that it was in breach of a Treaty obligation.2 9 In its
judgment of September 25, 1979, the Court declared that the French
Republic by continuing to apply after January 1, 1978 its restrictive
national system to the importation of mutton and lamb from the
United Kingdom, had failed to fulfill its obligations under Articles 12
and 30 of the EEC Treaty.30 Certain declarations in the French press
gave the impression that the Court's judgment would not be complied
with until the Community introduced a common organization of the
market in mutton and lamb. Early in 1980, the Commission brought
two actions before the Court for declarations that the French Republic,
by neglecting to take the necessary steps to comply with the abovementioned judgment, had failed to fulfill its obligations under Article
171 of the Treaty. In its defense, however, the French Republic argued
inter alia that Article 171 implies that Member States are allowed a
"reasonable period of time" for complying with judgments of the Court
and that in the present circumstances that period had not expired. The
problem, however, was solved at a political level with the introduction
of a common organization of the market in sheepmeat. Furthermore,
the additional cases brought by the Commission were withdrawn.
The most important aspect of the Court's jurisdiction is comprised
of references by national courts and tribunals for preliminary rulings
pursuant to Article 177 of the Treaty, which states:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a preliminary decision
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
27 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 169.
28 Id. at art. 171. It is interesting to note that there have been more cases brought by Member
States against the Community institutions than cases brought by the Commission against Member

States.
29 [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2729, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418.

30 Id. at 2740, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 433.
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(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community; and
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act of the
Council, where such statutes so provide.
Where any such question is raised before a court or tribunal of one of the
Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers that its judgment depends on a preliminary decision on this question, request the
Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a domestic
court or tribunal from whose decisions no appeal lies under municipal
law, such court or tribunal shall refer the matter to the Court of Justice.3 '
It should be emphasized that the Court of Justice is not the only tribunal called upon to interpret and apply Community law. Since
problems of Community law are often raised at first instance before
national tribunals, the courts in the Member States also interpret Community law.
In order to ensure uniformity in the interpretation and application
of Community law, Article 177 provides that the Court of Justice shall
have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaty and the validity and interpretation of "acts" (which
effectively means regulations, decisions and directives) of the Community institutions. Article 177, thus, constitutes a vehicle for judicial cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts and
tribunals for the purpose of ensuring, as far as possible, the uniform
interpretation of Community law throughout the ten Member States.
The importance of Article 177 lies not only in the fact that it constitutes a mechanism for achieving the uniform interpretation of Community law within the limits of judicial cooperation, but also in the fact
that the Court of Justice frequently decides points of law arising in
disputes between private persons and between private persons and national authorities charged with the implementation of Community
regulations.
It is interesting to note that, in the latter category of disputes in
particular, it is frequently open to the private person to contest before
his national court the validity of a Community regulation and to ask
that court to refer the question of validity to the Court of Justice under
Article 177. If the Court rules that the regulation in question is not
valid, the plaintiff will have achieved indirectly what he probably could
not have achieved by means of a direct action for annulment under
Article 17332 against the institution that issued the regulation. That
31 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 177.

32 Article 173 of the EEC Treaty provides that:
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lawyers in the Member States are becoming increasingly aware of this,
is evidenced by the steadily growing number of references from national courts asking the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, not
on the interpretation of a regulation, but on their validity.
Furthermore, the Court, as a result of cases brought before it
under Article 177 has been able to expressly formulate two fundamental principles of Community law which have given a powerful impulse
towards "European integration." First, the Court has developed the
doctrine that provisions of the Treaty and of acts by the Community
institutions can have direct effect, that is to say, they can create rights
for private persons which that person can invoke before their national
courts' and which those courts are bound to protect. Secondly, the
Court developed a doctrine of the primacy of Community law over
national law. In other words, a provision of Community law will prevail over a conflicting provision in the national law of the Member
States.
The first doctrine regarding the direct effect of Community created
rights was expressly stated in the Court's judgment in van fend & Loos
v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen. 3 This case arose in the
following way. Article 12 of the Treaty provides:
Member States shall refrain from introducing, as between themselves, any
new customs duties on importation or exportation charges with
equivalent effect and from increasing such duties
34 or charges as they apply
in their commercial relation with each other.
That Article took effect on January 1, 1958, the date on which the EEC
Treaty entered into force. Subsequently, by a protocol 5 entered into at
Brussels between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on July 25, 1958, a new
customs nomenclature was established. This protocol was ratified in
the Netherlands by a law on December 16, 1959. On September 9,
1960, the plaintiffs in the Netherlands court, van Gend & Loos, im[amny natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, appeal against a decision addressed to him or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision
addressed to another person, is of direct and specific concern to him.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 173.
33 [1963] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1963] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105 (reference for preliminary

ruling).
34 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 12.
35 Protocol between Belgium, Luxembourg and The Netherlands instituting a new schedule of
import duties, July 25, 1958, 352 U.N.T.S. 3 (enteredintoforce Mar. 1, 1960). These three countries had joined together in the Benelux union in 1948 which contained many aspects later reflected in the EEC such as a customs union and free movement of goods, capital and manpower.
The protocol was designed to ensure a common customs nomenclature which did not exist for the
community as a whole at that time.
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ported from Germany a quantity of a substance which I need not detail
here. On January 1, 1958, the product was classified under one customs heading and was charged with ad valorem import duty of 3%. In
the customs list which was established on March 6, 1960, by reason of
the December 16, 1959 law that heading was replaced by a new heading. Instead of applying a uniform duty for all the products falling
within the old heading, a subdivision was created under the new one
which contained the product in question and applied an import duty
fixed at 8%. Van Gend & Loos objected to paying the increased rate of
duty and appealed to the inspector of customs and excise. Their objection was dismissed by the inspector and they appealed to the
Tariefcommissie Amsterdam on April 4, 1961. That tribunal referred
the following question to the European Court for a preliminary ruling
inter alia:
(1) Whether Article 12 of the EEC Treaty has direct application within
the territory of a Member State, in other words, whether ... [nationals of
such a State] can, [on the basis of the Article in
36 question] lay claim to
individual rights which the courts must protect.
Apart from the plaintiff and the Commission of the European
Communities, the Netherlands Government, the Belgium Government
and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany submitted
observations to the Court. All three governments concluded that Article 12 of the Treaty did not constitute a legal provision directly applicable in Member States. In their view, it imposed an international
obligation which must be implemented by national authorities endowed with legislative powers and the obligation laid down applied
only as between the Member State concerned and other Member
States. The plaintiff and the Commission argued in favor of direct applicability. The Court, however, held that Article 12 created individual
rights which could be brought by an individual directly
and further37
more which national courts are bound to protect.
36 van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. at 3, [1963] Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 108.
37 The Court in van Gend& Loos, in holding that Article 12 created individual rights, emphasized that:
In addition the task assigned to the Court of Justice under Article 177, the object of which is
to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national courts and tribunals, confirms that
the states have acknowledged that Community law has authority which can be invoked by
their nationals before those courts and tribunals.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal
order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign
rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States
but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law
therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals, but is also intended to confer them
rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are
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The second doctrine developed by the Court involves rare cases in
which direct conflicts arise between a provision of national law and a
provision of Community law and gives rise to an issue in litigation
before national courts. As Judge Pescatore stated:
as regards the solution ofsuch conflicts, from the point of view of Commu-

nity law the position is simple and clear-cut: Community law cannot fulfill its function if it is incapable of prevailing purely and simply, in case of
conflict, over provisions of national law. In other words, for Commufnity
law primacy over national law is a genuinely "existential" requirement,
and for this reason absolute38and imperative, on which it cannot yield on

pain of ceasing to be itself.
The doctrine that Community law prevails over conflicting national law was clearly expressed in the Court's judgment in Costa v.
ENEL .3 This reference for a preliminary ruling arose out of a dispute
before a Milan court on the compatibility of an Italian law which nationalized the production and distribution of electrical energy, with certain provisions of the Treaty. The Italian government intervened in the
expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes
in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the
institutions of the Community.
. . . The wording of Article 12 contains a clear and unconditional prohibition which is
not a positive but a negative obligation. This obligation, moreover, is not qualified by any
reservation on the part of states which would make its implementation conditional upon a
positive legislative measure enacted under national law. The very nature of this prohibition
makes it ideally adapted to produce direct effects in the legal relationship between Member
States and their subjects.
The implementation of Article 12 does not require any legislative intervention on the
part of the states. The fact that under this Article it is the Member States who are made the
subject of the negative obligation does not imply that their nationals cannot benefit from this
obligation.
In addition the argument based on Articles 169 and 170 of the Treaty put forward by the
three governments which have submitted observations to the Court in their statements of case
is misconceived. The fact that these Articles of the Treaty enable the Commission and the
Member States to bring before the Court a State which has not fulfilled its obligations does
not mean that individuals cannot plead these obligations, should the occasion arise, before a
national court, any more than the fact that the Treaty places at the disposal of the Commission ways of ensuring that obligations imposed upon those subjects to the Treaty are observed, precludes the possibility, in actions between individuals before a national court, of
pleading infringements of these obligations.
A restriction of the guarantees against an infringement of Article 12 by Member States to
the procedures under Articles 169 and 1970 would remove all direct legal protection of the
individual rights of their nationals. There is the risk that recourse to the procedure under
these Articles would be ineffective if it were to occur after the implementation of a national
decision taken contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.
The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective
supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence
of the Commission and of the Member States.
It follows from the foregoing considerations that, according to the spirit, the general
scheme and the wording of the Treaty, Article 12 must be interpreted as producing direct
effects and creating individual rights which national courts must protect.
Id. at 12-13, [1963] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 129-30.
38 Pescatore, Community Law and the NationalJudge, [1973] LAW GUARDIAN No. 87.
39 [1964] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425 (reference for preliminary
ruling).
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proceedings before the Court of Justice and argued that the reference
was inadmissible because the sole function of the national judge was to
apply domestic law. In reply to this objection, the Court defined the
primacy of Community law in terms which have become classic. It
said inter alia:
.. . The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to
another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing
the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty ....
The obligations undertaken under the Treaty establishing the Community
would not be unconditional, but merely contingent, if they could be called
in question by subsequent legislative acts of the signatories ....
. . . the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law,
could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by
domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its
character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question.
The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty
carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against
which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the
Community cannot prevail. Consequently, Article 177 is to be applied
whenever questions relating to the interregardless of any domestic law,
4 °
pretation of the Treaty arise.
Subsequent Court decisions demonstrate that the doctrines of direct effect and of the primacy of Community law over a conflicting
provision of national law constitute the keystones of the Court's "integrationalist" jurisprudence. The re-affirmation of these doctrines essentially occurs in the context of preliminary rulings by the Court on
questions referred to it by national courts under Article 177.
It should be added that the Court has not established any requirements regarding the form of wording of the questions referred to it.
Although the Court accepts preliminary referrals, it may find it necessary to make it clear that it only has the power to interpret the law or to
pronounce on the validity of an act by a Community institution. The
assessment of the facts and the evaluation of the scope of national provisions alleged to be incompatible with national laws are matters for
the national court. In addition, the Court of Justice has refused to consider whether the questions referred to it are relevant to the issues in
the case before the national court.
It should be said, however, that in a recent controversial judgment,
Foglia v. Novello, 4 the Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to
40 Id. at 594, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 455.
41 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 745, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 45.

426
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give a preliminary ruling on certain questions referred to it by an Italian court regarding the compatibility of certain French fiscal legislation
with Article 95 of the Treaty. It refused jurisdiction inter alia on the
basis that in its view the dispute pending before the Italian court was
not a genuine legal dispute, but an artificially contrived case, the object
of which was to procure condemnation by the Court of Justice of
French fiscal legislation as applied to certain Italian liqueur wines, pursuant to proceedings before an Italian court.42
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE CASE LAW OF THE COURT IN THE CONTEXT

OF THE

EEC TREATY

The broad goals of the Common Market are set forth in Article 2
of the Treaty. This Article states that it:
[s]hall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States,
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in
stability, an accelerated raising of4 3the standard of living and closer relations between its Member States.
Article 3 provides that for the purposes set out in Article 2, the
activities of the Community shall include, as provided in the Treaty,
and in accordance with the timetable set out therein, certain common
policies, among them belong:
(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of
quantitative restrictions in regard to the importation and exportation of
goods, as well as of all other measures with equivalent effect;
(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy towards third countries;
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to the free
movement of persons, services and capital;...
(f) the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be
distorted in the Common Market;4
It is principally in these fields that contentious issues arise and
come before the Court by way of direct actions or by way of questions
referred by national courts or tribunals for a preliminary ruling.
From these areas I will endeavour to select certain aspects which
are among the most important in the activities of the Court and particularly those aspects in which it is possible to trace a certain evolution in
the case law of the Court since the Treaty came into being.
42 Id. at 759, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 57-59.
43 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 2.
44 Id. at art. 3.
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The Achievement of a Common Market Relating to Freedom of
Trade andthe Free Movement of Goods
L

Customs Duties and ChargesHaving Equivalent Effect

Part Two of the Treaty is entitled "Foundations of the Community" and Title I of that Part is the "Free movement of goods". Within
the provisions of that title, Article 9 provides:
[t]he Community shall be based upon a customs union covering the exchange of all goods and comprising both the prohibition as between
Member States, of customs duties on importation and exportation and all
charges with equivalent effect and the adoption of a common customs
tariff in their relations with third countries. 5
Article 12 requires Member States to "refrain from introducing, as
between themselves, any new customs duties on importation and exportation or charges with equivalent effect and from increasing such
duties or charges as they apply in their commercial selections with each
other.4 6
Periodically Member States have sought to restrain imports, not by
directly imposing a customs duty, but by levying a charge resulting in
an equivalent effect. A leading case in this respect is the so-called "gingerbread" case, Commission v. GrandDuchy of Luxembourg and Kingdom of Belgium4 7 in which the Court sets forth in extenso the reasons
for the incompatibility of a duty on import licenses for the product at
issue with the Treaty requirements.
According to the terms of Article 9, the Community is based on a customs
union founded on the prohibition of customs duties and of 'all charges
having equivalent effect'. By Article 12 it is prohibited to introduce any
'new customs duties on imports... or charges having equivalent effect'
and to increase those already in force.
...a charge having equivalent effect within the meaning of Articles 9
and 12, whatever it is called and whatever its mode of application, may be
regarded as a duty imposed unilaterally either at the time of importation
or subsequently, and which, if imposed specifically upon a product imported from a Member State to the exclusion of a similar domestic product, has, by altering its price,48 the same effect upon the free movement of
products as a customs duty.
In subsequent cases, the Court has given a very wide definition to
the concept of "a charge having equivalent effect to a customs duty".
In Cadsky v. Istituto Nazionaleper i Commercio Estero, the Court
stated that:
45

Id. at art. 9.

46 Id. at art. 12.
47 [1962] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 425, [1963] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (joined cases 2 and 3/62).
48 Id. at 432, [1963] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 215-16.
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[amny pecuniary charge, whatever its designation and mode of application,

which is imposed unilaterally on domestic goods by reason of the fact that
they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense,
49
constitutes a chargethehaving
State. equivalent effect.., even if it is not imposed
of
for the benefit

2. Discriminationin Taxation
Member States frequently seek to protect their domestic produc-

tion by imposing internal taxation on imported products in excess of
that imposed on similar domestic products. Such practices are prohibited by the first paragraph of Article 9550 of the Treaty, a provision
which-the Court held in 1966 as having direct effects so that a private

person may invoke it before his national courts.5 '

It is often difficult to distinguish between a charge having the

equivalent effect of a customs duty, which is incompatible with Articles
12 and 9, and a discriminatory internal tax which is incompatible with
Article 95. However, the distinction is an important one. Charges

which have an effect equivalent to a customs duty are wholly prohibited, while discriminatory internal taxes are prohibited only to the ex-

tent imposed on imported products.
Such discriminatory internal taxation takes a variety of forms, and
the Court is frequently confronted with cases of considerable technical
difficulty as well as of great economic importance. Three cases brought
by the Commission against France, Italy and Denmark for infringements of Article 95 in the first of internal taxation of alcoholic bever-

ages illustrate the complexity of discriminatory tax schemes. In
Commission v. French Republic the Court invalidated a French fiscal
49 Cadsky v. Istituto Nazionale per il Commercio Estero, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 281,
290, [1975] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 246, 255 (case 63/74). See also Commission v. Italian Republic,
[19681 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 617, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. I (where the Court found a charge
levied on the issue of an authorization to export works of art as having an effect equivalent to a
customs duty); Commission v. Italian Republic, [1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 193, [1971] Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 611 (where the Court found a statistical levy on imported goods as having an effect
equivalent to a customs duty); Marimex v. Italian Finance Administration, [1972] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1309, [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 486 (reference for preliminary ruling) (case 29/72) (where the
Court found a levy for sanitary inspection at the frontier as having an effect equivalent to a customs duty); and Variola v. Italian Finance Administration, [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 981,
[1975] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) T 8226 (preliminary ruling) (case 34/73) (where the Court found
an unloading charge as having an effect equivalent to a customs duty).
50 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 95. The first paragraph of article 95 provides that "[a]
Member State shall not impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied directly or indirectly to like domestic products." Id.
51 Laltticke v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis, [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 205, [1966] Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 378 (reference for preliminary ruling).
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measure which had the effect of favoring French products such as cognac, armagnac and calvados at the expense of imported liquors such
as whiskey, gin and vodka.52
The Court held an Italian tax invalid in Commission v. Italian Republic because the tax discriminated against spirits produced from
of liquors distilled
cured sugar case which are mainly imported in favor
53
from wine which are typically Italian products.
In Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, a tax which favored aquavit (a liquor produced mainly in Denmark) at the expense of beverages
having characteristics similar to aquavit was held to be discriminatory
and therefore unenforceable. The Court in Commission v. Kingdom of
Denmark adjudged that:
By the application of a discriminatory tax on spirits, as follows from Coordinated law No. 151 of April 4, 1978, the Kingdom of Denmark has

failed, as regards products imported from other
5 4 Member States, in its obligations under Article 95 of the EEC Treaty.

3. The Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions on Imports and
Exports between Member States and Measures Having
Equivalent Effect
It is obvious that customs duties and charges having the equivalent
effect are not the sole obstacles to the free flow of trade between Member States. Trade can be impeded by a wide variety of "non-tariff"
barriers, ranging from the imposition of quotas on imports and exports
(i.e. quantitative restrictions) to laws, regulations or mere administrative formalities rendering importation and exportation more difficult or
impossible. Thus, the Treaty prohibits in Articles 3055 and 3456 quanti52 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 347, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 631. The Court in Commirsion
v. French Republic declared that:
By the application of discriminatory taxation of spirits as regards, first, geneva and other
alcoholic beverages obtained from the distillation of cereals and secondly, spirits obtained
from wine and fruit, under Articles 403 and 406 of the Code Gdn6ral des Imp6ts, the French
Republic has failed, as regards products imported from other Member States, to fulfill its
obligations under Article 95 of the EEC Treaty.
Id. at 371, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 652.
53 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 385, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 673. The Court in Commirsion
v. Italian Republic held:
By the application of differential taxation onspirits in the form of tax banderoles affixed to
receptacles containing spirits intended for retail, as provided for by the Italian tax legislation
resulting from the provisions of Article 6 of Decree Law No. 745 of October 26, 1970,. . .as
regards, first, spirits obtained by the distillation of cereals and sugar cane and secondly, spirits
obtained from wine and marc, the Italian Republic has failed, as regards products imported
from the other Member States, to fulfill its obligations under Article 95 of the EEC Treaty.
Id. at 397, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 685.
54 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 477, 490 [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 688, 703.
55 Article 30 of the EEC Treaty provides that "[q]uantitative restrictions on importation and
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tative restrictions on imports and exports respectively, as well as all
measures having the equivalent effect between Member States.
In certain areas, however, where national sovereignty was not
transferred to the Community, the Treaty had to make provisions
which enabled Member States to regulate imports and exports so as to
give effect to national policies. These reserved matters are dealt with in
Article 36 which provides:
[Tihe provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not be an obstacle to prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importation, exportation or transit which
are justified on grounds of public morality, public order, public safety, the
protection of human or animal life or health, the preservation of plant
life, the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination
or a disguised restriction on trade between Member
57
States.

Article 36 is of particular importance with regard to industrial and
commercial property rights. The scheme of this article is to establish
the principle that although the exercise of such rights may legitimately
result in placing barriers in the way of the free movement of goods
across frontiers, the exercise of those rights may not constitute a means
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction between Member
States. 8
If the term "quantitative restriction" did not in itself raise enough
difficult interpretation questions much more elusive is the concept of
"measures having equivalent effect" which the Commission described
in its first General Report 59 on the activities of the Communities, the
latter concept as defined by the Commission appears to cover the totality of those laws, regulations and administrative measures and formalities which impede imports or exports, including those which make
imports or exports more difficult or expensive. The Court has been
called upon to consider this concept in relation to a wide diversity of
matters. 60
all measures with equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, hereby be

prohibited between Member States." EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 30.
56 Id. at art. 34. The first paragraph of article 34 provides that "[q]uantitative restrictions on
exportation and any measures with equivalent effect shall hereby be prohibited as between Member States."
57 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 36.
58 This principle is itself an exception to the objective for the free movement of goods within

the Community.
59 [1967] COMM'N EUR. COMM. GEN'L REP. ON THE AcnvrmaES OF THE COMM. 41-42.
60 Examples of matters in which the Court has considered the concept of "measures having

equivalent effect" include designation of origin, Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, [1979] E.
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The Court in Procureurdu Roi v. B&G Dassonville, defined measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions as being:
[a]ll trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community
trade ....
'
Obviously as with all broad formulations specific cases are bound to
present problems. Other considerations such as the need to adequately
protect designations of origin be kept in mind. In Dassonville, the
question at issue was the right to sell in Belgium what was in fact genuine Scotch whisky, but which had been imported via France and, therefore, was not accompanied with a certificate of origin from the British
Excise authorities which Belgian law requires.
The Court in Dassonville articulated the following test when considering proof of origin:
[i]n the absence of a Community system guaranteeing for consumers the
authenticity of a product's designation of origin, if a Member State takes
measures to prevent unfair practices in this connection, it is however subject to the condition that these measures should be reasonable and that
the means of proof required should not act as a hindrance to trade between Member States6 2and should, in consequence, be accessible to all
Community nationals.

The Commission was not satisfied that the system of certificates
demanded by the Belgian government measured up to this test and
therefore initiated proceedings under Article 169 against Belgium for
failing to comply with Treaty obligations. The gravamen of the Commission's complaint was that if Belgium was prepared to accept bottles
with appropriate labelling and fitted with the type of capsule which had
to be destroyed in opening the bottle, all administrative difficulties for
the importer would be eliminated and the authenticity of the product
assured. However, the Belgian government would not accept this argument. The Belgian government asserted that under the Commission's
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1761, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 216; trademarks and patents, EMI Records
Limited v. CBS United Kingdom Limited, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 811, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L. Rep. 235 (preliminary ruling); quality controls, Procureur de la Rdpublique, Besancon v.
Bouhelier and Others, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3151, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 541 (preliminary ruling); pharmaceutical controls, Officier van Justitie v. Kortmann, [1981] E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 251 (preliminary ruling); sanitary and phytosanitary inspections, Rewe-Zentralfinanz
GmbH v. Landwirtschaftskammer, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 843, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.
Rep. 599 (preliminary ruling); and, more recently, various forms of price control and price fixing
by national authorities, Pigs and Bacon Commission v. McCarren and Company, Limited, [1979]
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2161, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 389 (preliminary ruling).
61 [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837, 852, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 436, 453 (preliminary
ruling).
62 Id. at 853, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 454.

432

The Court of Justice

3:415(1981)
plan, it would still be too easy to falsify labels and capsules. The Court
ultimately held that Belgium was- not in breach of Article 30. Since
certain changes had been made in the certificate procedure which effectively assured the authenticity of the product, while at the same time
making parallel imports possible. Under these circumstances, the
Court was not prepared to hold that the Belgian system was
unreasonable.63
From the numerous decisions of the Court on the subject of measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports
and exports, I will refer to just three in order to illustrate the variety of
national measures with which the Court must consider.
In Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany,64 the Court
granted the Commission's application for a declaration that the Federal
Republic of Germany failed to fulfill its Treaty obligations because it
reserved to German products the appellations "Sekt" and "Weinbrand". The effect of this limitation was that imported products satisfying the same legal obligations could not be marketed under these
appellations, which are very popular in Germany. For the German
consumer, these appellations denote a type and quality of beverage and
do not constitute designations of origin. In this case, the Court ruled
that:
By reserving these appellations to domestic production and by compelling
the products of the other Member States to employ appellations that are
unknown or less esteemed by the consumer, the legislation on vine products is calculated to favor the disposal of the domestic product on the
German market to the detriment of the products of other Member States.
Thus, this legislation on vine products involves measures having an effect
equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports ....
1
In Donckerwokcke v. Procureurde la Republique, referred for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunal Correctionnel, Lille, the Court ruled
that a Member State may require an importer to make a declaration
concerning the origin of goods in order to avoid deflection of trade as
prohibited under Article 115 of the Treaty. However, it cannot require
him to declare something other than what he knows or may reasonably
be expected to know. 66 Secondly, the Court held that the Member
State's requirement must not impose a penalty disproportionate to its
63 Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1761, [1980] 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 216.
64 [1975] E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 181, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 340.
65 Id. at 198, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 364.
66 [1976] E. Comm. CL J. Rep. 1921, 1941 [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 535, 554-555.
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purely administrative character.6 7 It is a fact, however, that many
measures having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction, are
merely administrative formalities which constitute to a greater or lesser
degree, a constraint on trade.
The prohibition of measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions
was recently considered in the context of national measures prescribing
maximum or minimum selling prices for certain products. There often
are important social reasons for imposing maximum or minimum selling prices. Minimum prices are generally imposed in order to prevent
undercutting by large business to the detriment of small shopkeepers;
maximum prices may be imposed in an effort to hold down the cost of
living. At the same time, however, a minimum price fixed at a specific
amount, although applicable without distinction to domestic and imported products, may have an adverse effect on the marketing of imported products. This adverse effect will occur when it is cheaper to
produce the imported product, yet the minimum fixed price prevents
the lower costs from being reflected in the retail selling price. The imposition of maximum prices, however, may result in a foreign product
costing more to produce, and therefore being totally excluded from the
market.
The Court recently considered national measures imposing minimum prices in the case of OpenbaarMinisterie of the Netherlands v. van
T'ggele.68 In this case, Dutch legislation provided for a minimum retail selling price for certain types of gin. The Advocate General explained this system in the following manner:
It is both well known and accepted that widely-consumed products sold

in a large self-service store are generally offered at lower prices than in
businesses where customers are served individually by a shop assistant.

Such lower prices are the result of economies in staffing costs brought
about by the self-service system of marketing and generally through the
discounts which large stores can obtain when purchasing goods since their
orders are in bulk and usually greater than these of small-scale traders.
Furthermore, the greater volume of sales permits large stores to restrict
their profit margin per unit as compared with that required by small businesses. Thus, since the imposed price in question prevents unrestricted
competition from lowering the price of alcoholic beverages to such a level
that it would no longer be profitable for small-scale retailers, it constitutes
a measure of support for the latter.6 9

The Court drew a distinction between the fixing of a minimum profit
margin at a specific amount and the fixing of a specific minimum price.
67 Id.

68 [19781 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 25, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 528 (preliminary ruling).
69 Id. at 49, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 542.
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Regarding the former case, the Court held that if it is applied without
regard to whether the products are domestic or imported, it is incapable
of producing an adverse effect on imported products which may be
cheaper. The Court stated:
On the other hand this is not so in the case of a minimum price fixed at a
specific amount which, although applicable without distinction to domestic products and imported products, is capable of having an adverse effect
on the marketing of the latter in so far as it prevents their lower cost price
from being reflected in the retail selling price.7 °
There is in fact a copious body of case law relating to the conflict
between national measures for price control and Community prohibitions on measures having the equivalent effect of quantitative restrictions. In particular, the Court is confronted with a conflict between a
Community regulation setting up a common market organization for a
certain agricultural product 7(which includes a common pricing system)
and price control measures. '
Article 36,72 has been the subject of many decisions by the Court
of Justice and will no doubt continue to be regularly invoked since it
provides the Member States withprimafaciejustification for imposing
trade barriers which may in fact have been introduced for protectionist
reasons. On the other hand, there are many situations in which Article
36 can legitimately be invoked. For example, in matters of sanitary
control, where a Community scheme does not exist, a Member State
may impose its own conditions when necessary to achieve objectives
referred to in Article 36.
One of the most delicate problems the Court must face is the resolution of the conflict between imperatives resulting from principles of
the free movement of goods enshrined in the Treaty and exclusive
rights, which are of a territorialcharacter, and therefore derive from
national legislation or industrial and commercial property rights. In
considering whether the exercise of such a right is "justified" under
Article 36, the Court attempts to ascertain what it calls the "specific
subject-matter" of the protection accorded by the national law in question 74 and the "essential function" of the right at issue. 75 Even if the
70 Id. at 40, [19781 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 548.
71 This complex field of law deserves in itself a lengthy dissertation and many useful and
illuminating articles have been written on this difficult and important subject.
72 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 36.
73 See, ag., Tedeschi v. Denkavit Commerciale, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1555, [1978] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1.
74 For example, in the case of a trademark, the Court must ascertain whether the proprietor of
a mark has the exclusive right under national law to use that mark to put the marked product into
circulation. See Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. I. Rep.
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Court finds that the rights in question are being exercised in conformity
with the nature of the subject matter and function which they exist to
protect, the Court may further consider whether their use in a context
of anti-competitive practices should be categorized as "arbitrary discrimination" or as a "disguised restriction" within the meaning of the
proviso to Article 36. Recently, the Court has been particularly scrupulous in attempting to ensure that the "core" of an industrial or commer6
cial property right is not eroded.1
4. State Aids and State Monopolies
Article 3777 of the Treaty requires that State monopolies of a commercial character be progressively adjusted so that at the end of the
transitional period there is no discrimination regarding the conditions
under which goods are processed and marketed between nationals of
Member States. This article is not the only Treaty provision to acknowledge the power of the individual states to affect commerce either
internally or externally. Article 9078 deals with problems which arise
when public undertakings and specially granted undertakings are given
exclusive rights. Article 9279 accords deal with the question of State
aids, mainly by prohibiting, with certain limited exceptions, the granting of State aids without the Commission's prior approval.
Cases involving Articles 90 and 92 have often been complicated by
the existence of State monopolies. For example, in Pigs Marketing
Board (NorthernIreland)v. Redman8" and Pigs andBacon Commission
. McCarrenand Company,8 1 the Court considered the compatibility of
the State pig marketing systems of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic respectively with a number of Treaty provisions, including those
relating to State aids. In these cases, however, since there was a com1039, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 482 (preliminary ruling); EMI Records Limited v. CBS Schallplatten GmbH, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 913, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235 (preliminary
ruling).
75 In the case of a trademark, the Court must determine the identity of the origin of the
marked product for the consumer or final user. See Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, [1979]
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1761, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 216.
76 See Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapferer & Co., [1976] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1039, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 482; Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Centrafarm, [1978] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1139, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 217 (preliminary ruling); Centrafarm v.
American Home Products Corporation, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1823, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 326.
77 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 37.
78 Id. at art. 90.
79 Id. at art. 92.
80 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2347, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 177 (preliminary ruling).
81 [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2161, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 389 (preliminary ruling).
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mon Community scheme for pork and bacon, the Court preferred to
approach the problem by considering first the nature of the Community scheme and then the compatibility of the national marketing systems with the Community plan. The Court in Pigs Marketing Board8 2
acknowledged the primacy of the common agricultural policy over
other Treaty provisions stating: "the provisions of the Treaty relating
to the common agricultural policy have precedence, in case of any discrepancy, over the other rules relating to the establishment of the Common Market." 3
An analogous approach was adopted by the Court in Hansen v.
HaupIzollamt Fensburg 4 concerning state alcohol monopoly in Germany. Despite this state monopoly, certain categories of producers,
generally the small-scale producers of fruit-based liqueurs, may make
and sell their products without being required to pass them through the
monopoly. Thus, they pay a slightly lower tax than generally levied on
liqueurs sold by the monopoly and by importers of foreign-produced
alcohol.
The Advocate General, in an earlier case, laid down the following
legal test: "Article 37 is the sole criterion for judging monopoly charges
and monopoly equalization, since Article 37 is lex specialis in relation
to Article 952"85

In Hansen, however, the Advocate General did not agree stating:
"[in my view, it is preferable to take account also of Article 95, the
general provisions concerning tax discrimination."" 6
The Hansen court followed this latter approach. The Court stated:
[i]t
appears preferable to examine the problem raised by the national
court primarily from the point of view of the rule on taxation laid down
in Article 95, because it is of a general nature, and not from the point of
37, which is specific to arrangements for State
view of Article
87
monopolies.
The Court concluded that in light of Article 95, any preferential aspect
of the German tax system should be extended without discrimination
to spirits coming from other Member States.
82 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2347, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 177.

83 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2370, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 200.
84 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 1787, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 604 (preliminary ruling).
85 Rewe-Zentrale des Lebensmittel-Grosshandels GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Landau/Pfalz,
[1976] E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 181, 210, f1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 14 (preliminary ruling).
86 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. at 1817, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 612.
87 Id. at 1806, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 624.
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The Social Law of the Community

The preamble to the Treaty delegates to the Member States among
other things, the task of bringing about social progress and "the constant improvement of the living and working conditions" of their nationals. The means of achieving these objectives are sought in the main
by measures designed to achieve freedom of movement for workers,
entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between
workers of the Member States regarding employment, remuneration
and other employment conditions attain freedom for Community citizens to establish themselves and provide services in any Member
States, and bring about equal remuneration for men and women.
These principles, though not yet fully operative, have been implemented to a large extent by many regulations and directives of the
Council, the Commission and by numerous decisions of the Court of
Justice and national courts.
The fields covered by these Treaty principles is vast and the most
one can hope to do in the context of a brief article of general scope is to
highlight certain of the most important aspects and developments of
the case law in this area.
1.

Freedom of movement for workers

Article 48 provides that "[f]reedom of movement for workers shall
be secured within the Community by the end of the transitional period
at the latest". 8 The Court has been quick to hold that the term
"worker" must have a Community meaning. It applies to all those
who, under whatever title, are covered by the various national systems
of social security, that is to say, not only employed persons in the strict
sense of the term, but all those treated as such under those systems. 89
88 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 48, para. I. The transition period was twelve years long,
id. at art. 8, para. 1, and began on Jan. 1, 1958, the date that the Treaty took effect, [1977] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH)) 1 196.05. The transition period ended as scheduled on Dec. 31, 1969. Id. at
196.11. Recent signatories to the treaty have established individual transition periods. Greece,
for example, became the tenth member of the Community in May, 1979, id. at 7441.01, and
freedom of movement of workers between the Community and Greece will be achieved over a
seven year transitional period, scheduled to end in 1986. Id. at 1 7441.07.
However, the Community achieved the policy of complete mobility of workers between the
original signatory members eighteen months before the end of the Treaty's twelve year transition
period. Regulation No. 1612/68, which the Council adopted on Oct. 15, 1968 prohibited employ-

ment discrimination by any Community employer against nationals of Member States. 11 J.O.
COMM. EuR. (No. L 257) 1 (1968); [1971] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) T 1031A-Y. The only exception to this remains to be employment in a member nation's public service, EEC Treaty, supra
note 1, at art. 48, para. 4.
89 Unger v. Bestuur der Bedrijfvereininging Voor Detailhandel en Ambachten, [1964] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 177, 185, 187, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 319, 330, 333.

438-

The Court of Justice

3:415(1981)

Thus, the term has been held to cover non-manual workers, travelling
business representatives and others. 90
Under the second paragraph of Article 48, freedom of movement
for workers entails "the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment." 9'
In Commission v. France, the Court held that by maintaining in force a
French law providing that a certain proportion of the ship's personnel
of commercial vessels had to be recruited from French nationals, the
French Republic was in breach of its obligations under Article 48.92
The third paragraph of Article 48 declares that freedom of movement for workers shall entail the right, 'subject to limitationsjustfedon
grounds ofpublic policy,public security or public health":

(a) to accept offers of employment actually made,
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this
purpose,
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that
State ...

and

(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions ...

in implementing regula-

93
tions to be drawn up by the Commission.
The concept of "public policy" is found in all the legal systems of the
Member States, yet, it is a difficult concept to define with precision. In
view of this, the Council attempted to lay down more concrete principles than previously available, notably by way of directives. The first
and most important Directive was No. 64/221/EEC of February 25,
1964. 94 Article 3 of that Directive provides, in particular, that "meas-

90 Yet freedom of movement is guaranteed only to those who wish entry to a member country
either to carry out an economic activity or to obtain services, or because they are a family member
of a person in those pursuits. Thus, the Commission has ruled that it was permissible for France
to refuse entry to nationals of Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Belgium who
were to demonstrate against a nuclear power plant inside France. Written Question No. 233/79,
Submitted by Mr. Hoffman, Member of the European Parliament to the Commission of the European Communities, 22, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 214) 31 (1979).
91 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 48, para. 2.
92 Commission v. French Republic, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. I. Rep. 359, 372-73, [1974] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 216, 230-31.
93 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 48, para. 3 (emphasis added).
94 7 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 56) 850 (1964), O.J. EUR. COMM. 117 (SPEc. ED. 1963-64).
Directive No. 72/194 of May 18, 1972, 15 J.O. Comm. EuR. (No. L 121) 32 (1972), O.J. EUR.
COMM. 474 (Spec. Ed. 1972 (12)) and Directive No. 75/35 of Dec. 17, 1974, 15 O.J. EuR. COMM.
(No. L 14) 14 (1975) broadened the 1964 Directive (No. 64/221) to include Member State nationals who stay in a member state's territory under rights extended by Regulation No. 1251/70, 13
J.O. Comm. EuR. (No. L 142) 24-26 (1970), O.J. EUR. COMM. 402-404 (Spec. Ed. 1970 (II)) (setting conditions on the right of workers to remain in a member state after employment in that
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ures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security shall be
based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned" 95 and that "previous convictions shall not in themselves consti'
Thus, reasons of
tute grounds for the taking of such measures."96
public policy cannot be invoked for economic purposes.
It is possible to discern in the Court's decisions regarding the
"public policy exceptions" to the free movement of workers, an unmistakable trend, after initial hesitation, towards a restrictive interpretation of the internal concept of public policy. Thus the Court in effect is
reinforcing the security of workers who have established themselves in
a host Member State.
The first decision by the Court regarding the "public policy exception" was Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office 97 . In this case, Miss
Van Duyn, a Dutch national, had accepted a position as a secretary
with the Church of Scientology in England. That sect propagates a
philosophy which is considered socially harmful in Great Britain but
which is not unlawful so that British nationals are allowed to practice
it. The Court of Justice, in Van Duyn, while insisting that the scope of
the concept of public policy could not be fixed unilaterally by the
Member States without control by the Community institutions, decided
in effect that the United Kingdom was entitled to prevent a national or
another State from taking gainful employment within its territory with
an organization whose activities are considered by the host country as
being socially harmful without, however, being unlawful despite there
being no restriction imposed on its nationals wishing to take such employment.9 8 In reality, the Court of Justice confirmed the content of
British public policy in the manner in which it had been assessed by the
British government.
The Court of Justice refused to allow deportation of an individual
on general public policy grounds. In Bonsignore v. Oberstadtdirektorde
Stadt Koln,9 9 the Court held that in order to deport an individual for a
statutory offense, the decision must be based on the "personal conduct"
of the offender. The facts of the case are as follows. Bonsignore, an
state), or under rights extended by Directive No. 75/34 of Dec. 17, 1974. Directive No. 75/34
relates to nationals of Member States who exercise their right to remain in the territory of another
member state "after having pursued therein an activity in a self-employed capacity." 18 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 14) 14 (1975).
95 7 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 56) 851 (1964). O.J. EUR. COMM. 118 (Spec. Ed. 1963-64) (emphasis added).
96 Id. at art. 3, para. 2 (emphasis added).
97 119741 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1337, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. I (preliminary ruling).
98 Id. at 1352, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 18.
99 [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 297, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 472 (preliminary ruling).

The Court of Justice
3:415(1981)
Italian national, went to work in Germany in 1968. In 1971, he bought
a pistol without being in possession of a firearms permit. While handling the pistol, he accidentally killed his brother. He was fined for the
offense pursuant to the firearms legislation, but was not punished for
negligently causing the death of his brother. However, he was ordered
to be deported from German territory by an administrative decision on
the grounds that:
since offenses by aliens involving the use of arms has risen to a substantial
degree, during recent years, a further increase in these crimes of violence
must, be countered by the immediate expulsion of aliens who had come to
the notice of the authorities for offenses against the firearms legislation.10 0
The administrative reasonfor the decision was one of a "generalprevenlive nature," namely to deter otherforeign nationalsfrom committing an
identical offense, and was not based on "thepersonalconduct" of Bonsignore revealing the existence of a sufficiently grave and foreseeable
threat to the security and public policy of the host country. Thus, Germany could not deport Bonsignore under their present reasoning.' 0'
The Court in Rutili v. Ministerfor the Interior'02 reiterated the
principle that restrictions on movement within the Common Market
must be based on the "personal conduct of the alien." Furthermore,
for the first time the Court of Justice linked its decision to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that restrictions on fundamental rights, imposed
by reason of the needs of public policy, must not go beyond what is
03
necessary for the protection of those rights "in a democratic society".1
In fRutili, the French Prefect of Police restricted the resident's permit of
an Italian national, Rutili, prohibiting him from residing in Lorraine.
Rutili had engaged in trade union activities a number of which were of
political character. It was after these political incidents that the limitation had been placed on his permit, his presence in Lorraine having
been qualified as "likely to disturb public policy". 4 The case was referred to the Court of Justice from the Tribunal Administratif, Paris.
The Court, in holding that the restriction on movement must be based
on individual conduct, further stated that public policy reservation cannot be invoked on grounds arising from the exercise of trade union
5
activities. 1
100 Id. at
101 Id. at
102 [1975]
103 Id. at
104 Id. at
105 Id. at

310, [19751 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 477 (Submissions of the Advocate General).
306-08, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 488-89.
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 140 (preliminary ruling).
1232, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 155.
1222, 1228, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 142, 153.
1232, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 155.
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The Court made clear in Royer,"°6 that the right of a Community
national to enter a Member State and reside therein, is acquired independently of the issue of a residence permit.° 7 Furthermore, the right
of residence extends to the worker's spouse.'1 8 In re Watson, 0 9 the
Court held that failure to comply with legal formalities concerning access to a residence in a Member State does not justify a decision ordering expulsion as a breach of public policy."'
In its ruling in Regina v. Bouchereau,"I the Court narrowed even
further its interpretation of the "public policy" exception to the freedom of movement for workers. Bouchereau, a French national,
pleaded and was found guilty in July, 1976, of unlawful possession of
cannabis, an offense punishable under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
Previously, in January of that year, he had been found guilty of an
identical offense before another court and conditionally discharged for
twelve months. The Magistrate was to make a recommendation regarding deportation to the Secretary of State pursuant to section 6(1) of
the Immigration Act 1971. Bouchereau argued that Article 48 of the
Treaty and the provisions of the 1964 Directive prevented such a recommendation from being made. Amongst other things, the Magistrate
sought guidance on the interpretation to be given to the concept of
"public policy" under Article 48.
The Court, recognizing that circumstances justifying recourse to
the notion of public policy may vary from one country to another and
therefore the competent national authorities provided for a margin of
discretion within the limits imposed by Community law, held that in
order to deport an individual on public policy grounds there must be a
sufficiently serious threat to fundamental societal interest. The Court
stated:
In so far as it may justify certain restrictions on the free movement of
persons subject to Community law, recourse by a national authority to the
concept of public policy presupposes, in any event, the existence, in addition to the perturbation to the social order which any infringement of the
law involves, of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the require106 Jean Noel Royer, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 497, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 619 (prelimi-

nary ruling).
107 Id. at 512, [19761 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 639.
108 Id., [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 639.
109 Lynne Watson and Allessandro Behnann, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1185, [1976] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 552 (preliminary ruling).
110 Id. at 1198-99, 1200-01, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 571-73.
111 [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1999, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 800 (preliminary ruling). The
case followed a request made by a Metropolitan Stipendary Magistrate, sitting at Malborough
Street Magistrate's Court in London.
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ments of12 public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of
society.'
Article 51 of the Treaty provides that the Council shall:
• . . adopt such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to
provide freedom of movement for workers; to this end, it shall make arrangements to secure for migrant workers and their dependents:
(a) aggregation,for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right
to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken
into account under the laws of the several countries; and
to persons resident in the territories of
(b) payment
1 13 of benefits
Member States.
In implementation of Article 51, the Council has adopted successive
regulations which create rules to coordinate the national legislative systems on social security.1 14 These regulations create rules coordinating
the national legislative systems on social security. In applying these
rules, the Court has attempted to reduce the distortions between national schemes by providing the worker, his dependents, and survivors,
rights in the Community legal system which are capable of preserving
the advantages acquired under various national schemes and of aggregating them. The reason for this application of the regulations as explained is that the objective of social progress laid down in the Treaty
would be repudiated if, in order to use the freedom of movement available to him, the worker were to lose rights already acquired in one
Member State without having them replaced by at least equivalent benefits in another. The Court has therefore not hesitated to say that certain provisions on aggregation contained in the regulations are
incompatible with Article 51 and, therefore, invalid to the extent to
which their application has the effect of reducing a benefit already acquired in one Member State alone." 5
112 Id. at 2014, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 824.
113 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 51 (emphasis added).
114 The first set of regulations consisted of Regulation No. 3, 1 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 30) 561
(1958), concerning social security for migrant workers, and Regulation No. 4, 1 J.O. COMM. EUR.
(No. 30) 597 (1958), which set out implementing procedures and supplementary procedures for
the social security provisions. Regulations 3 and 4 entered into force on Jan. 1, 1959.
Regulation No. 1408/71, 14 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 149) 2 (1971), O.J. EUR. COMM. 416
(Spec. Ed. 1971 (1)) superceded Regulation No. 3. Notably, Regulation No. 1408/71 broadened
the definition of "worker" to include all those covered in optional or compulsory social security
schemes for employed persons. Regulation No. 574/72 of Mar. 21, 1972, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR.
(No. L 74) 1 (1972), O.J. EuR. COMM. 159 (Spec. Ed. 1972 (1)), superceded Regulation No. 4,

fixing the procedure for the implementation of Regulation No. 1408/71. Regulation No. 574/72
entered into force in Oct., 1972. Id. at art. 122, 15 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 74) at 41, OJ. EuR.
COMM. at 199 (Spec. Ed. 1972 (r)).
115 See, eg., Fonds National de Retraite des Ouvriers Mineurs (FNROM) v. Yvon Salmon,
[1980] E. Comm. Ct. I. Rep. 1937, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 303 (preliminary ruling); Niemann
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This very cursory account of Community law in the field of social
security for facilitating freedom of movement for migrant workers and
their families gives little indication of the voluminous case law of the
Court in this field. There are many other aspects of this area beyond
the scope of this article. 16 Instead, I will focus on the Treaty provisions which guarantee the freedom to pursue an occupation within the
other Member States.
2

Freedoms grantedby the Treaty to se/f-employedpersons

The Treaty provisions regarding the pursuit of occupations are
based on the principle of equality of treatment for community nationals. Thus, Article 7117 prohibits in general terms any discrimination on
grounds of nationality. Article 48118 regarding employed persons and
Article 53119 regarding the right of establishment give more specific expressions of this principle of equality of treatment.
The second paragraph of Article 52 states that "...
[f]reedom of
establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as
self-employed persons. . . under the conditions laid down for its own
nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected. .. "120 In order to make it easier for persons to take up these
activities, Article 57 provides that the Council shall issue directives
".. . for the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications' 2! and for the coordination of the provi-

sions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action"
v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt flr Angestellte, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 571 (preliminary ruling); Petroni v. Off. National des Pensions pour Travailleurs Salaries (ONPTS), [1975] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1149 (preliminary ruling).
It is only when aggregation of the periods is necessary in order to establish a right to benefit
that the calculation of the benefit is apportionedso as to correlate with the length of the period of
work carried out in a given Member State compared to the total of the period of work carried out
in the whole of the Community. See, e.g. Kalsbeek (nee van der Veen) v. Bestuur der Sociale
Verzekeringsbank and Nine Other Cases, [1964] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 565, [1964] Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 548 (reference for a preliminary ruling).
116 The problems which arise in balancing benefits in one Member State against different benefits payable in another, for example, are beyond the scope of this article. See Romano v. Institut
National d' Assurance Maladie-Invalidite, Case No. 98/80, May 14, 1981 (unreported), European
Court of Justice (First Chamber) which dealt with a Belgian invalidity pension, whose scheme
provided for it to be reduced by a pension amount which the pensioner also received from Italy.
117 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 7.
118 Id. at art. 48. See text accompanying notes 86-107 supra.
119 Id. at art. 53. Article 53 prohibits member states from introducing . . . any new restrictions on the right of establishment in the territories of other Member States," except as the Treaty
otherwise provides. Id.
120 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 52, para. 2.
121 Id. at art. 57, para. 1.
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concerning the taking up and pursuit of such activities. 2 2 Unhappily,
the directives provided for by Article 57 have largely not yet been
adopted. But this factor has proved to be of minor importance since
the Court ruled in Reyners v. Belgian State123 that Article 52 is a directly applicable provision of Community law, despite the absence, in a
particular sphere, of the directives prescribed by Article 57(1).124
Article 59 provides for the progressive elimination of restrictions
on the right to provide services. 2 5 Article 60126 supplies a non-exhaustive definition of "services"' 2 7 and in its third paragraph states that:
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating to the right of

establishment, the person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity in the State where the service is provided,

under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own
nationals.128

The Court ruled in 1974 that Article 59 became directly applicable
at the expiration of the transitional period.'2 9
The Court in Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de BedriCsvereniging
Id., para. 2.
123 [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 631, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 305 (preliminary ruling).
124 Id. at 652, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 327. The Court was able to use this interpretation
of the "self-executing" character of Article 52 to rule in Case 71/76, Thieffry v. Conseil de l'Ordre
des Avocats a la Court de Paris, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 765, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 373
(preliminary ruling) that:
[w]hen a national of one Member State desirous of exercising a professional activity,
such as the profession of advocate, in another Member State has obtained a diploma in his
country of origin which has been recognized as an equivalent qualification by the competent
authority under the legislation of the country of establishment and which has thus enabled
him to sit for and pass the special qualifying examination for the profession in question, the
act of demanding the national diploma prescribed by the legislation of the country of establishment constitutes, even inthe absence of the directives provided for in Article 57, a restriction incompatible with the freedom of establishment guaranteed by Article 52 of the Treaty.
Id. at 779, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 404-05. Similarly, in Case 11/77, Patrick v. Ministre des
Affaires Culturelles, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1199, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 523, the Court
stated in its judgment that:
[w]ith effect from January 1, 1973, a national of a new Member State who holds a qualification recognized by the competent authorities of the Member State of establishment as
equivalent to the certificate issued and required in that State enjoys the right to be admitted
to the profession of architect and to practice it under the same conditions as nationals of the
Member State of establishment without being required to satisfy any additional conditions.
Id. at 1206-07, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 530-31.
125 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 59. Article 59 applies specifically to the nationals of a
Member State other than the state in which the service would be performed. Id.
126 EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 60.
127 Article 60 states that the Treaty covers services normally provided for remuneration, not
covered by other Treaty provisions which relate ". . . to freedom of movement for goods, capital,
and persons." "Services", as Article 60 defines them, particularly include activities of an industrial or commercial character, and the activities of craftsmen and of the professions. Id.
128 Id., para. 3.
129 Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedriljsvereinging voor de Metaalnijverheid, [1974] E.
122

Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1299, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 298 (preliminary ruling).
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voor de Metaalnifverheid 30 affirmed the right to provide services in its
interpretation of Articles 59 and 60. In that case, the appellant in the
proceedings before the Centrale Raad van Beroep (the referring court)
had entrusted the defense of his interests to a legal r epresentative of
Netherlands nationality entitled to act before courts where representation by an advocaat is not obligatory. This legal representative during
the course of the proceedings, transferred his residence from the
Netherlands to Belgium. His capacity to represent the party in question was contested on the basis of a provision of Netherlands law which
require that only persons residing in the Netherlands may act as a legal
representative before that courts. This prompted the Centrale]?aad van
Beroep to refer to the Court two questions on the interpretation of Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty.
The Court ruled:
1. The first paragraph of Article 59 and the third paragraph of Article 60
of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that the national law
of a Member State cannot, by imposing a requirement as to habitual residence within that State, deny persons established in another Member
State the right to provide services, where the provision of services is not
subject to any special condition under the applicable national law;
2. The first paragraph of Article 59 and the third paragraph of Article 60
have direct effect and may therefore be relied on before the national
courts, at least in so far as they seek to abolish any discrimination against
a person providing a service by reason of his nationality or the fact that he
resides in 31
a Member State other than that in which the service is to be
provided.1
The Court has held in the field of sport, insofar as it constitutes an
economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty that
professional or semiprofessional sportsmen are to be regarded as workers or as persons providing services; 132 therefore, they are entitled to
practice their sport in all Member States notwithstanding discriminatory measures based on nationality established by public authorities or
1 33
sporting organizations.
130 Id.

131 Id. at 1312-13, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 315.
132 Dona v. Mantero, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1333, 1340, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 578,
587 (preliminary ruling); WaIgrave and Koch v. Association Union Cyeliste Internationale and
Others, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1405, 1418, [1974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 320, 331-32 (preliminary ruling).
133 It is important to note, however, that only discriminatory measures of an economic nature
have been held incompatable with the treaty. A sporting organization may still apply measures
which relate to the particular nature and context of sporting matches. If the discriminatory measures are "of sporting interest only", then such measures may "limit the right to take part in [sporting] matches as professional or semi-professional players" solely to nationals of the state of the
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Recently, the Court has held in Procureur de Roi v. Debauve1
that Articles 59 and 60 do not preclude national rules prohibiting the
transmission of advertisements by cable television if those rules are applied without distinction as to the national or foreign origin of the advertisements or the nationality of the person providing the service and
the place where he is established.13 5 Nor have these articles been held
to preclude an assignee of a performing right for a cinematographic
film within a Member State from relying upon this right to prohibit the
exhibition of that film in that State, without his authority, by means of
cable diffusion even if the exhibited film is transmitted after being
by a third party with the consent of
broadcast in another Member State
136
the original owner of the right.

3.

The Principleof EqualPayfor Men and Women

Article 119 of the Treaty mandates equal pay for men and women.
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently
maintain the application of the principle that men and women should
receive equal pay for equal work.
For the purpose of this Article, "pay" means the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in
kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his
employment from his employer.
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means:
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the
basis of the same unit of measurement;
13 7
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job.
In addition certain Community Directives have been issued on the subject of equal pay and equal treatment for men and women. For example, Directive 75/117 provides for the harmonization of the Member
States' laws relating to the application of the principle of equalpay for
men and women; 3 ' Directive 76/207 requires equal treatment for men
and women regarding access to employment, vocational training, proissuing sporting organization. Dona v. Mantero, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1342, [1976] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 588.
134 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 833, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 362 (preliminary ruling).
135 Id., at 863, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 395-396. However, Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC
Treaty, note I supra, do not regulate the broadcasting of advertisements by television. Instead,
advertisements fall under treaty provisions relating to the free movement of goods. Guiseppi
Sacci, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 177 (preliminary ruling).
136 S.A. Compagnie Generale pour la Diffusion de la Television, Coditel, and Others v. S.A.
Cine Vog Films and Others, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 881, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.IL 362
(preliminary ruling).
137 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 119.
138 10 OJ. EuL COMM. (No. L 45) 19 (1975).
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motions and working conditions;13 9 and Directive 79/7 mandates equal
40
treatment for men and women in matters of social sec4rity.'
Regarding the decisions of the Court in this field, and in particular
on the nature and scope of Article 119, no discussion would be complete without an examination of the Defrenne cases. 14 1 Miss Defrenne
was an air hostess in the employment of the Belgian airline, Sabena
S.A. The Court's decisions in each of these cases resulted from requests
for preliminary rulings from Belgian courts in which Miss Defrenne
was engaged in litigation over various aspects of what she considered to
be discriminatory treatment of the basis of her sex.
At issue in Defrenne I was a retirement pension established within
the framework of a social security scheme laid down by legislation.
The Court held that such a retirement pension "does not constitute the
Belgian benefit paid indirectly by this employer to the employee by
reason of the latter's employment within the meaning of Article 119,
paragraph 2, of the EEC Treaty."' 142 Thus, according to the Court,
Miss Defrenne was not receiving discriminatory treatment from her
employer within the scope of Article 119.
But the leading case on equal pay for men and women is Defrenne
11. 143 The action before the Cour du Travail, Brussels, was between
Miss Defrenne and her employer Sabena S.A. concerning compensation claimed by Miss Defrenne on the ground that between February
15, 1963 and February 1, 1966, she suffered as a female worker discrimination in terms of pay with male colleagues who were doing the same
work as "cabin steward". It was agreed between the parties that the
work was identical and there was no dispute as to the existence of discrimination in pay to the detriment of Miss Defrenne during the period
in question.
The national court asked the Court of Justice whether Article 119
introduced directly into the national law of each Member State the
principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work
and therefore did it independently of any national provision, entitle
139 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 40 (1976). For a discussion of this Directive and related
action, see [1978] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 3910.123.
140 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 6) 24 (1979).
141 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Belgian State, [1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 445, [1974] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 494 (reference for a preliminary ruling) [hereinafter "Defrenne I"]; Gabrielle Defrenne v.
Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Arienne Sabena, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455, [1976] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 98 (preliminary ruling) [hereinafter "Defrenne I"]; Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Belge de Navigation Arienne Sabena, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1365, [1978] 3
Comm. Mkt. L. R. 312 (preliminary ruling) [hereinafter "Defrenne III"].
142 Defrenne I, [1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 452-53, [1974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 508-09.
143 Defrenne II, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 457, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 102.
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workers to institute proceedings before national courts in order to ensure its observance. If so, from what date must this effect be
recognized?
On the question of the "direct effect" of Article 119 the Court
pointed out that this article had a twofold purpose. First, an economic
one. The aim of the article was to avoid a situation in which undertakings established in States which had actually implemented the principle
of equal pay suffer a competitive disadvantage in intra-Community
competition as compared with undertakings established in States which
had not yet eliminated discrimination against women workers as regards pay. 1"Second, Article 119 formed part of one of the social objectives of the Community, namely to ensure by common action the social
progress and working conditions of their peoples, as is emphasized by
the Preamble to the Treaty. That double aim illustrated that the principles of equal pay formed part of the foundations of the Community.1 4 5
The Court recognized, however, that a distinction must be drawn
within the whole area of application of Article 119 between, first, direct
and overt discrimination, which may be identified solely with the aid of
the criteria based on equal work and equal pay referred to by the article and, secondly, indirectand disguiseddiscrimination which can only
be identified by reference to more explicit implementing provisions of a
Community or national character.14 6 However, the Court noted that
among the forms of direct discrimination identifiable solely by the criteria laid down by Article 119, there must be included those which have
their origin in legislative provisions or in collective labor agreements. 147
Thus, direct discrimination included situations where men and women
received unequal pay for equal work carried out in the same establishment or service, whether public or private. The Defrenne II case was
one such situation and Article 119 was directly applicable. Thus, Article 119 could give rise to individual rights which the courts must protect. The Court therefore replied to the first part of the question in the
following manner:
the principle of equal pay contained in Article 119 may be relied on
before the national courts and that these courts have a duty to ensure the
protection of the rights which this provision vests in individuals, in particular as regards those types of discrimination arising directly from legislative provisions or collective labor agreements, as well as in cases in which
men and women receive unequal pay for equal work which is carried out
144
145
146
147

Id. at 472,
Id., [1976]
Id. at 473,
Id. at 473,

[1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 122.
2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 122.
[1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 123.
[1976] 2 Comm. Mkt L.R. at 123-24.
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in the same establishment or service, whether private or public.'

The Court, however, ruled that the direct effect of Article 119

could not be relied upon in order to support claims concerning pay
periods prior to the date of the Court's judgment, "except regarding

those workers who had already brought legal proceedings or made an
equivalent claim. 149 The converse situation could, according to the
British and Irish governments, who had submitted observations on the
case, have disastrous financial consequences on numerous undertakings, even to the extent of driving them into bankruptcy. While not
founding its ruling on these observations, the Court referred to the fact

that several Member States had been dilatory in implementing Article
119, and furthermore, that the Commission had failed to initiate proceedings against these States under Article 169.150 The Court declared

that it was appropriate to take "exceptionally" into account and, therefore, considered the fact that, over a prolonged period, the parties concerned had been led to continue with practices contrary to Article 119,
although not yet prohibited by their national law.' 51 Further, as the
general level at which pay would have been fixed could not be known,
important considerations of legal certainty affecting all the interests involved, made it impossible in principle to reopen questions as to the
past. 152 If this reasoning may be open to criticism, the result may per-

haps still be thought to be sound!'5 3 Finally, and most recently, in Case
129/79, MacarthysLid v. Wendy ,Smith,154 the Court explained its interpretation of Article 119.115
III.

CONCLUSION

156
The foregoing pages have given only a cursory and incomplete

148 Id. at 476, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 125.
149 Id. at 481, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 128.
150 Id. at 480, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 128.
151 Id., [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 128.
152 Id. at 481, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 128.
153 In Defrenne 111, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1365, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 312, the
Court refused to interpret Article 119 as prescribing in addition to equal pay, equality in respect to
other working conditions.
154 Macarthys Ltd. v. Wendy Smith, [19801 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1275, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 205 (preliminary ruling).
155 The Court ruled that the principle of equal pay for equal work of Article 119 was not
confined to situations where men and women are contemporaneously doing equal work for the
same employer. [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1290, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 214-16. Thus,
Article 119 guaranteed women pay equal to that of men previously employed in positions involving equal work. Id. at 1291, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 216.
156 For example, I have felt constrained to omit, in the interest of comparative brevity, any
treatment, which perforce would have to be fairly lengthy, of the rules on conpetition enshrined in
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overview of the range of problems with which the Court has had to
deal under the various aspects of its jurisdiction under the EEC Treaty
since its inception 23 years ago. In some areas, it has opted for bold
solutions, such as the doctrines of "direct effects" and the primacy of
Community law; while in others it has shown itself to be more circumspect. Its ever increasing work load does, however, attest to its vigor as
the sole judicial institution of the Community. The furtherance of the
Community aims, as expressed in the Treaty, is never far from the
Court's collective mind when considering the manifold problems of
Community law with which it is confronted.

the Treaty and their interpretation and application by the Commission and the Court. Similarly, I
have given no account of the interpretation ofthe Common Customs Tariff, which is the subject of
numerous decisions of the Court.

